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There has been increasing interest of late in the question of whether minimum 
wage regulations can raise productivity through the ‘shock effect’. This paper 
explores this question in comparative perspective, by examining the impact of 
minimum  wage  regulations  and  institutions  in  Denmark,  New  Zealand  and 
Ireland.  It  argues  that  while  they  are  important,  a  supportive  institutional 
framework plays a far more crucial role in providing coordinated solutions to 
issues  of  market  failure,  such  as  inadequate  levels  of  training.  The  paper 
suggests that sectoral bargaining institutions in low-paid sectors may have the 
potential to facilitate such coordination and enable the high-productivity model 
to emerge. For the UK context, this raises the question as to whether Wages 
Councils in a modernised form might have some future role to play. 
 
JEL Codes: J38; J58; J80; P52 
 
Keywords: National Minimum Wage; Low pay; Training; Productivity; Labour 
market coordination; Comparative employment relations. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The  support  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council  is  gratefully 
acknowledged.  The  paper  was  written  while  I  was  an  ESRC  Postdoctoral 
Fellow at the Centre for Business Research (award number PTA-026-27-1142). 
I am also grateful for comments on the paper by Simon Deakin and for the 
















Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the 
following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk  1 
Introduction  
One of the arguments in favour of a minimum wage is that it has the potential to 
increase  productivity  by  encouraging  employers  to  invest  in  training  and  to 
adopt a quality-based product market strategy in order to offset rising wage 
costs. Thus, firms are ‘shocked’ into adopting a ‘high road’ approach rather than 
a cost-minimisation one. This hypothesis has been the subject of much research 
in the UK recently. When a NMW was introduced by the Labour Government 
in 1999 there were predictions that this would happen (LPC, 1998:15), but the 
evidence suggests it has had limited impact in this regard. In trying to explain 
this,  a  number  of  contributions  have  pointed  to  a  range  of  institutional 
constraints on employers that prevent them from responding in the predicted 
way (e.g. Grimshaw and Carroll; 2006), while others have begun to look at the 
institutional supports necessary to enable firms to overcome these constraints 
(Edwards et al., 2002).  
Drawing on the experiences of Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand, this paper 
seeks to add to our understanding of the sorts of institutional arrangements that 
encourage firms to adopt a ‘high road’ strategy and those that undermine this 
objective. In particular, the paper focuses on the issue of training. This is for 
two reasons. Firstly, investment in human capital is the most obvious route to 
raising  productivity  for  many  low-paid,  service-intensive  industries,  such  as 
retail and hospitality. And secondly, skills shortages and insufficient training are 
significant problems in both Ireland and New Zealand, despite comparatively 
high  minimum  wages.  Underpinning  this  are  competitive  product  market 
conditions, poor profitability and high staff turnover. Thus, the paper argues that 
simply increasing firms’ costs by raising the minimum wage will not be enough 
to ‘shock’ low-paid industries down the high-productivity route, because the 
issue of low pay is inextricably linked with these other factors. As the paper will 
show, Denmark illustrates the benefits of a coordinated approach to these issues 
and  the  complementarities  that  can  be  delivered  through  a  supportive 
institutional  framework.  Both  Ireland  and  New  Zealand  are  attempting  to 
implement  innovative  solutions,  but  in  each  case  voluntarist  approaches  are 
employed and questions are raised about whether the appropriate institutional 
mechanisms  are  being  created.  One  institutional  mechanism  that  the  paper 
suggests may have the potential to both support and shock firms down the ‘high 
road’, is legislatively supported industry bargaining mechanisms. These might 
do so by enabling training outcomes to be embedded in the wage bargaining 
system, while providing the forum for interrelated and complex industry issues 
to  be  addressed.  For  this  to  occur,  institutional  arrangements  need  to  be 
developed that facilitate industry coordination and are underpinned by social 
partnership.    2 
Productivity and the minimum wage 
Among the most articulate supporters of the proposition that a minimum wage 
can  provide  a  boost  to  productivity  through  transforming  firms’  competitive 
strategies and employment practices have been Wilkinson, Brosnan and Deakin 
(e.g.  Brosnan,  2003;  Brosnan  &  Rea,  1991;  Brosnan  &  Wilkinson,  1988  & 
1989; Deakin & Wilkinson, 2000 and 2005; Wilkinson, 1983). Beginning with 
Wilkinson’s seminal paper in 1983 they have consistently promoted this thesis, 
arguing on the basis of ‘productive systems’. In the context of a low minimum 
wage (or no minimum wage), the availability of low-wage labour means there is 
little incentive for employers to increase productivity through investing in new 
technology or worker training, or to re-organise production. Firms can become 
trapped in a ‘productive system’ that competes on low-cost rather than on the 
basis of quality, service, innovation or technology. By introducing or raising the 
minimum  wage,  low-cost  firms  will  be  ‘shocked’  into  adopting  the  high-
productivity road to competitiveness. Rising wage costs will place pressure on 
management  to  raise  productivity  through  more  efficient  work  practices, 
advanced technology, or a value-added product market strategy. These all imply 
the need for greater skill levels and an emphasis on providing on-going training. 
Employers,  therefore,  will  be  keen  to  reduce  turnover  given  the  added 
investment in their workforce. This gives employees greater bargaining power 
and the potential to bargain for even higher wages. Hence, the high-productivity 
route becomes a virtuous circle.  
Good  employers  may  realise  the  benefits  of  competing  on  the  basis  of  a 
management strategy that focuses on innovative employment practices or value-
added  product  market  strategies,  rather  than  strategies  that  focus  on  cost-
minimisation.  However,  in  product  markets  where  cost-based  strategies 
dominate, pursuing such a long-run approach may be difficult to sustain due to 
price undercutting by competitors. Thus, the argument is made that a minimum 
wage can promote such long-term strategies on a wider scale, driving an entire 
industry towards a more ‘productive system’. Clearly this is not a process of 
events that will occur in a short space of time, and it is for this reason that 
Deakin and Wilkinson (2005: 346) refer to it as long-run dynamic efficiency, in 
contrast to the orthodox and rather static view of efficiency. 
The UK National Minimum Wage and employer responses 
Some of these arguments for the productivity-enhancing effects of a minimum 
wage have gained significant currency in UK policy circles. For example, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 1998) in its evidence to the Low Pay 
Commission (LPC) cited the likely benefits of a minimum wage on training and 
thus on productivity. The LPC (1998:15) initially agreed, and pointed to the   3 
way in which the NMW would encourage firms to compete on quality as well as 
price, and to increase productivity by investing in training, raising employee 
commitment and reducing staff turnover. 
However, despite the predictions the empirical evidence suggests that there has 
been little impact in this regard, and more recently the LPC has acknowledged 
this (LPC, 2003: 69).  A range of studies assessing firms’ actual responses to the 
implementation of the minimum wage have been conducted in the UK since 
1999. These have tended to focus on the responses of small and medium sized 
enterprises, as it is in these firms that the NMW is likely to have the greatest 
impact (Arrowsmith et al., 2003: 435). The results show that, while a small 
number of firms have responded to the minimum wage by increasing training or 
adopting a niche market strategy (e.g. Drucker et al., 2005), and a small number 
have been driven into the grey economy (Ram et al., 2001), by far the most 
common response has been ‘business as usual’. Thus, the NMW in the UK has 
had no noticeable shock effect (see review by Grimshaw and Carroll, 2006: 25-
29). 
The minimum wage and the wider institutional framework 
What then do these results suggest about the potential for a minimum wage to 
encourage employers to improve employment practices or adopt a value-added 
product market strategy? One reading is that the minimum wage is not high 
enough to set in motion the long-run dynamic  process that Wilkinson et al. 
describe, a view expressed by many commentators (e.g. Grimshaw and Carroll, 
2006:  23;  Deakin  and  Wilkinson,  2005:  342).  This  may  be  part  of  the 
explanation  as  the  minimum  wage  in  the  UK  is  only  around  40  percent  of 
average earnings, which is slightly below the OECD average (DTI, 2006: 90). 
Given the range of indeterminacy that exists in the setting of wages in small 
firms in competitive industries (Gilman et al., 2002) and the tendency towards 
informality in the employment relationship (Ram et al., 2001), the additional 
costs imposed by the NMW could be absorbed without firms having to adjust 
their practices (Arrowsmith et al., 2003).  
A second explanation is that a high minimum wage is not enough on its own to 
encourage firms to adopt a ‘high road’ strategy. Rather, a high minimum wage 
needs to be embedded in a supportive institutional framework, and in the case of 
the UK, the necessary supportive institutional mechanisms that might enable 
this  long-run  dynamic  process  to  come  about  are  not  present.  Thus,  as 
Grimshaw and Carroll (2006) found, a number of constraints were preventing 
the high-productivity approach from emerging in response to the NMW in their 
study of small firms in six low-paying sectors. One key factor was the highly 
competitive product market conditions, which meant firms were less able to   4 
finance increased training. They also found that a fear of poaching of trained 
employees prevented investment in staff. Given that high staff turnover (Adam-
Smith et al., 2003: 41; Bullock et al., 2001: 17) and skill shortages (Arrowsmith 
et al., 2003: 445; Bullock et al. 2001: 17) affect many low-paid industries, it is 
not surprising that many employers are not prepared to take the risk of investing 
in training, or to adopt a value-added product market strategy that is dependent 
on skilled-staff for success. This is particularly so for SMEs who lack the in-
house capacity for training and where having staff away at off-the-job training 
will be more disruptive to operational requirements than in larger firms. Thus, 
as a number of researchers who have assessed employers’ responses to the UK 
NMW  have  concluded,  the  minimum  wage  is  just  one  factor  among  many 
impacting on firms, and product and labour market conditions tend to be more 
significant  influences  on  employers’  behaviour  (Adam-Smith  et  al.,  2003; 
Grimshaw and Carroll, 2006; Ram et al., 2001). Indeed, rather than the ‘high 
road’ virtuous circle that Wilkinson et al describe, Grimshaw and Carroll (2006: 
43) refer to a “vicious circle of constraints” in highly competitive sectors that 
prevent firms from responding in the predicted way. 
Deakin and Wilkinson (2000: 26) do acknowledge that the wider institutional 
framework is important in creating the environment for the high-productivity 
model to emerge. They also note that much remains to be done on the types of 
regulatory and institutional frameworks that might create the complementarities 
to make interventions such as the minimum wage effective drivers of a high-
productivity approach. 
Of course, much has been written in the last decade or so about the notion of 
complementarities  and  the  way  in  which  institutional  arrangements  within 
different  models  of  capitalism  interact  to  facilitate  different  outcomes  (e.g. 
Amable,  2003).  Hall  and  Soskice  (2001)  distinguish  between  liberal  market 
economies  (LMEs)  and  coordinated  market  economies  (CMEs).  CMEs  are 
known for their ability to deliver a range of public goods necessary for building 
a high-wage, high-productivity economy. One of these is as an effective system 
of training. The high cost of wages imposed through collective bargaining is 
certainly one element in forcing employers to compete on quality rather than 
simply on cost and to invest in training to ensure worker productivity matches 
labour costs. However, it is only one element. The institutional mechanisms for 
capital-labour and inter-firm coordination are also crucial in overcoming the 
disincentives to train evident in the above discussion. The issues of poaching 
trained employees by employers who do not train and thereby incur lower costs 
is  one  generally  associated  in  the  literature  with  LMEs.  It  is  the  classic 
‘prisoners’ dilemma’. By coordinating their actions, employers can achieve a 
more effective outcome, but in LMEs there are few coordinating mechanisms.   5 
Employers  are  encouraged  to  ‘free-ride’  rather  than  invest  in  training 
themselves, with the end result being a lack of skills in the economy, or what 
Finegold and Soskice (1988: 25) called a ‘low-skills equilibrium’. This then 
drives these economies down the low-cost, low-wage, low-productivity route to 
competitiveness. In CMEs the wider institutional framework overcomes these 
limitations  and  provides  the  incentives  to  invest  in  training.  Thus,  there  are 
strong  links  between  the  training systems  and  the  wage  bargaining systems. 
Union involvement also ensures that employers take a long-run approach. In 
addition,  the  inter-firm  system  of  strong  employer’  associations  places 
obligations on members to contribute financially to the training system, (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Streeck, 1992, 1997; Thelen, 2004)
1. As Crouch et al. (1999) 
note, in LMEs the training problem is one of market failure. Hence, it is not one 
that can be solved by individual firms but requires institutional solutions. This is 
why firms in LMEs that attempt a ‘high road’ strategy often find it difficult to 
sustain  in  an  environment  where  cost-minimisation  strategies  dominate 
(Konzelmann and Forrant, 2003; Locke and Kochan 1995: 374). 
In this light, a high minimum wage is only one tool and in many ways quite a 
blunt tool for addressing low productivity, particularly where low pay is partly 
the result of poor profitability. If a particular industry is caught in a low-wage, 
low-skills  equilibrium  it  will  take  more  than  NMW  regulations  to  enable  a 
critical mass of firms to move it in a ‘high road’ direction. While these may play 
an  important  role,  some  institutional  supports  for  inter-firm  or  industry 
cooperation and coordination will be needed to facilitate this process. 
This  raises  the  dilemma  between  voluntarist  and  mandatory  approaches  to 
building institutional arrangements in LMEs. Recent contributions to the debate 
over institutional supports in the UK have promoted voluntarist options. For 
example,  Gospel  and  Foreman  (2006)  point  to  the  role  of  government  in 
supporting  and  funding  inter-firm  training  initiatives.  Edwards  et  al.  (2002) 
highlight  the  role  that  business  associations  could  play  in  enabling  the 
development of local networks, the promotion of best practice and the policing 
of the grey economy, as well as calling for an active government industrial 
policy embedded in local-level institutions. Much of this literature, however, 
acknowledges the significant barriers that a voluntarist approach faces, such as a 
reluctance by small firms to accept outside advice (Edwards et al, 2002: 17; 
Hoque and Bacon, 2006: 533), the poor reputation of various national training 
certification systems (Hoque et al., 2005: 138 & 148; Grimshaw and Carroll, 
2006:  44),  and  the  failure  to  date  of  various  government  initiatives  in 
encouraging SMEs to engage in training (Hoque and Bacon, 2006: 547).    6 
Those promoting voluntarist approaches may not necessarily oppose forms of 
compulsion, but rather recognise there is not much political will for mandatory 
solutions. However, doubts remain about how successful voluntarist approaches 
can be in addressing what are essentially issues of market failure. As the New 
Zealand and Irish cases will show, it will take more than just the promotion of 
best  practice,  supportive  business  associations  or  active  industrial  policy  to 
overcome the ‘vicious cycle’ that Grimshaw and Carroll (2006) describe. As 
Streeck  (1997)  argues,  sometimes  the  preferences  of  firms  need  to  be 
constrained in order that they adopt alternative strategies; strategies that may be 
economically more beneficial
2.  
The rest of this paper seeks to address some of these issues by examining how 
effective the institutional arrangements in Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland 
are  in  enabling  firms  in  low-paid  sectors  to  adopt  ‘high  road’  strategies.  In 
particular, it focuses on the issue of enterprise-led training and the extent to 
which institutional structures facilitate investment by firms in training.  
Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland 
Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland make for an interesting comparison for two 
reasons. Firstly, between them they present a mix of institutional structures for 
addressing  low-pay.  Denmark  actually  has  no  minimum  wage,  but  it  has 
effective minimum rates of pay through the extensive coverage of collective 
agreements. The lowest pay rates in the agreements are estimated to be between 
60 and 70 percent of average earnings
3. Ireland and New Zealand have both 
increased their minimum wages significantly in recent years, and with minimum 
to average wage ratios of more than 50 percent, they are at the high end of the 
scale  of  OECD  countries.  Ireland  also  has  a  system  of  industry  bargaining 
mechanisms  in  low-paid  sectors.  Secondly,  their  approaches  to  addressing 
productivity issues in low-paid sectors are quite different. Thus, the experiences 
of  these  three  countries  provide  some  useful  insights  into  the  sorts  of 
institutional  supports  that  might  create  the  environment  in  which  the  high-
productivity model can emerge. 
The following sections are based on semi-structured interviews with 80 senior 
representatives  of  employers’  organisations  and  trade  unions,  senior  civil 
servants and industrial relations academics across the three countries. The first 
round of interviews was conducted during 2004-05 and follow-up interviews 
were  conducted  in  each  country  during 2006-07.  Interviews  were  conducted 
with social partners at both national and sectoral level. At sectoral level, the 
interviews were across a range of low-paid sectors. Because of time constraints 
involved  with  conducting  research  in  different  countries,  an  ‘availability   7 
sample’ method was used. That is, where contact was established easily, those 
interviews were conducted first, and other potential research participants were 
pursued  until  it  was  felt  a  broad  enough  range  of  perspectives  had  been 
uncovered  in  the  time  available.  The  most  willing  research  participants  at 
sectoral  level  were  in  retail  and  hospitality,  and  thus  much  of  the  evidence 
relates to these sectors. A smaller number of participants represented cleaning, 
nursing care and security.  
Denmark 
The ‘Danish model’ of industrial relations is of increasing interest to both policy 
makers and scholars of comparative institutions. For some, interest in Denmark 
relates  to  the  ‘flexicurity’  approach,  where  liberal  employment  protection  is 
balanced by generous social protection. This has contributed to low rates of 
unemployment and strong economic growth over the last decade, and hence the 
European Commission has been espousing the benefits of ‘flexicurity’ for some 
time. For others, such as the ILO, interest in Danish industrial relations also 
includes the benefits of social dialogue, income equality and ‘decent work’ for 
both social and economic outcomes (Egger and Sengenberger, 2003). The focus 
here is limited to the training system and the complementarities delivered by its 
interaction with a range of other institutional mechanisms. While Denmark is a 
high-wage, high-productivity economy, high wages are only one factor driving 
productivity  growth.  Rather,  it  is  the  range  of  supportive  institutions  that 
encourage firms to adopt a ‘high road’ competitive strategy. 
Denmark has less labour market legislation than New Zealand or Ireland for 
protecting low-paid workers. Instead it has a highly institutionalised system that 
delivers good wages and working conditions through a patchwork of collective 
agreements  that  cover  around  75  to  85  percent  of  the  workforce.  Areas  of 
working life that in many countries would be covered by legislation, such as 
minimum wages, overtime rates or rules on working time, are all dealt with in 
collective  agreements.  This  approach  is  effective  at  delivering  equitable 
outcomes, with Denmark having comparatively few workers classified as ‘low 
paid’
4 (Lucifora et al, 2005: 265). And as was noted earlier, the minimum pay 
rates in collective agreements are comparatively very high at between 60 and 70 
percent of average hourly earnings. 
It should be noted that while the overall picture for low-paid workers is positive 
in  a  comparative  light,  unions  representing  low-paid  sectors  face  greater 
challenges than unions in other sectors. Union density rates in Denmark are 
around  75  percent  but  they  are  considerably  lower  in  low-paid  sectors.  The 
union representing hospitality workers (formerly the RBF and now part of 3F)   8 
estimated density to be about 30-40 percent in that sector. They also reported 
undercutting from employers not party to collective agreements, exploitation of 
unskilled  workers  and  difficulties  getting  employers  to  sign  up  to  collective 
agreements. Nonetheless, the collective bargaining system is deeply embedded 
in  the  institutional  framework,  and  despite  some  of  the  difficulties  unions 
representing low-paid workers face, there has not been the decrease in incomes 
of the lowest paid experienced in many other countries. 
The comparatively high wages for low-paid workers should, according to any 
neo-classical assessment, cause significant job losses. However, not only are 
unemployment levels low at 3.9 percent (OECD, 2007) but the high wages of 
low-paid workers are not viewed as problematic by the Danish social partners. 
The standard employer discourse elsewhere about high minimum wages causing 
unemployment simply does not feature in Denmark. In many ways this was 
surprising  given that  in  May 2004,  when  the  first  round of  interviews  were 
conducted, the eight accession countries had just joined the EU. This would 
have increased the opportunities for business to relocate in pursuit of cheaper 
labour. Yet this was not seen as a major threat to Danish competitiveness. The 
reason  for  this  is  a  shared  understanding  among  the  social  partners  that 
Denmark is a high-wage, high-productivity economy; it cannot and should not 
compete on a low-cost basis. As one union official pointed out, in low-paid 
manufacturing  jobs such  as  textiles,  Denmark  cannot possibly  compete  with 
countries  such  as  Poland.  Not  even  a  10  percent  cut  in  wages  for  Danish 
workers would make a difference to competitiveness. Thus, job losses in such 
sectors are accepted as an inevitable consequence of increasing globalisation. 
Pursuing a high-productivity strategy and training and retraining workers who 
might lose their jobs is seen as the way to deal with the issue, rather than getting 
drawn into low-wage competition. 
There are a number of components to this high-productivity strategy, and high 
wages may be one factor encouraging Danish firms in low-paid sectors to seek 
higher productivity in order to be competitive. However, high wage costs on 
their  own  would  not  be  enough  to  encourage  them  down  the  ‘high  road’ 
competitive  path.  Indeed,  in  the  area  of  training  there  are  two  very  strong 
incentives for Danish firms not to invest in their workforce. The first is the high 
mobility  of  workers  as  a  result  of  the  liberal  employment  protections,  with 
approximately one third of the workforce changing job each year (Aagaard et 
al., 2004: 13). The second factor is the large number of small and medium sized 
firms that dominate the Danish economy. As was noted earlier, small firms have 
less  capacity  for  in-house  training,  and  sending  staff  to  off-the-job  training 
causes greater disruption to the operation of a firm.    9 
These disincentives have been overcome by adopting a coordinated approach to 
training, an approach that ensures that Denmark has some of the highest levels 
of  continuous  training  in  the  OECD  (Mailand,  2006:  11).  Granted,  the 
Government makes a significant contribution to the funding of continuous and 
vocational training system with the highest spend as a proportion of GNP in the 
OECD (Lundvall, 2002: 83), and this undoubtedly plays an important role in the 
success  of  the  Danish  training  system.  However,  extensive  coordination 
mechanisms also underpin the system. Here we consider just two – levies on 
employers  and  social  dialogue  –  to  illustrate  the  complementarities  that  are 
delivered by the interaction of various institutional arrangements. 
Employers make financial contributions to a coordinated solution to the ‘free 
riding’ problem in two ways. The first is through a state-imposed levy on all 
firms, where some of the funds are used to finance adults on training courses 
(Lassen  et  al.,  2006:  17).  The  second  is  through  the  system  of  collective 
bargaining.  The  coordinated  wage  bargaining  system  in  Denmark  with  its 
comprehensive coverage has enabled unions to negotiate for training clauses in 
collective agreements, and it is one of the areas that they negotiate over in each 
bargaining round. Employers covered by these agreements pay a small levy into 
a sector fund, which the social partners use to develop and review the training 
courses and training needs of the sector. These funds cover a wide range of 
sectors, including low-paid sectors such as retail and hospitality. More recently, 
the  major  Danish  unions  have  signalled  their  intentions  to  make  continuous 
training a significant bargaining issue in coming rounds. While the government 
pays a significant part of the wages of employees away on training, the concern 
of unions is that not all firms compensate workers for the difference between 
government funding and lost wages, and that this is a disincentive for workers 
to undertake training, particularly so for unskilled and low-paid workers. Thus, 
in the 2007 bargaining round unions negotiated for more substantial employer 
contributions to a new training fund to cover this difference. In addition to the 
levies, most collective agreements also include training leave for employees of 
up to two weeks per year to undertake training of their choice. For unskilled 
workers there is a wide range of vocationally specific as well as general, school-
level courses (literacy, maths, science, IT, etc.) that are State funded. 
While  the  financial  contributions  of  the  State  and  employers  are  important, 
equally  important  is  the  consensus-based  relationship  between  the  social 
partners built on a culture of dialogue, cooperation and mutual trust. The social 
partners are involved at national, industry and local levels in the development 
and implementation of training policy, institutions and the courses themselves. 
This ensures that there is feedback between the local level on the one hand and 
industry and national bodies on the other. At the local level, employers and   10 
workers sit on the boards of local training institutions in order to develop and 
adapt training programmes to provide a match with the skills required in the 
local  labour  market  (Egger  and  Sengenberger,  2003:  49).  Hence,  training 
courses are modernised and linked to the changing demands of industry. This 
also ensures that firms value the training certification systems, which in turn 
contributes  to  worker  mobility  and  improves  labour  market  flexibility.  The 
involvement  of  the  social  partners  also  enables  the  training  certification 
schemes to be embedded in the wage bargaining system, and thus for wages to 
be closely linked with training outcomes (Bosch and Charest, 2006: 302). This 
does not happen in all cases, partly as a result of the increasing decentralisation 
to workplace level of the wage component of bargaining. But where it does 
occur, it provides an additional incentive for workers to engage with the training 
schemes as it will lead to higher wages. Finally, the involvement of the social 
partners reinforces at enterprise level the value of training and education for 
economic  success, and shop stewards play an important role in encouraging 
workers to avail of training opportunities. 
Denmark is on the whole a success story in the area of training, but it too faces 
challenges. Like most countries, there is an imbalance in training towards those 
in  higher  and  medium-skilled  occupations.  Additionally,  within  low-paid 
sectors there is some evidence of diverging employer training strategies. For 
example, a recent study of training in the retail sector (Martin and Knudsen, 
2007)  found  a  number  of  supermarket  chains  almost  exclusively  employ 
unskilled  workers  and  offer  them  no  training  in  basic  transferable  skills, 
whereas another supermarket chain operates a high profile training strategy and 
has  been  named  among  the  best  places  to  work  in  Denmark.  An  extensive 
review of the entire Danish adult and vocational training system, which was 
undertaken by a tripartite committee between 2004 and 2006, also highlighted 
this training imbalance and it has recommended a greater resource focus on 
unskilled workers (Jørgensen, 2006). This imbalance was one reason why the 
unions bargained for the new training fund in the latest bargaining round. 
While there are some issues, comparative data suggests Denmark does well in 
terms of continuous training for unskilled workers (Ok and Tergeist, 2003: 12), 
and the recent review process illustrates the determination of the social partners 
to continually improve Denmark’s skills base and ensure that certain sections of 
the workforce are not left behind. 
Thus, the Danish case shows that high wages are not the only factor in driving 
an industry in a ‘high road’ direction. Rather, a range of institutions interact to 
enable effective solutions to be developed for complex industry issues, as well 
as for old solutions to be modernised in the face of changing economic and   11 
social conditions. While the discussion was limited to the issue of training, other 
issues might equally have been addressed, such as the coordination between the 
social  partners  and  the  tax  department  to  tackle  the  increase  in  small  firms 
operating in the grey economy and undercutting legitimate businesses. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand is well known for its radical deregulation of the labour market in 
1991 under the Employment Contracts Act (ECA). Perhaps less well known is 
the policy shift since 1999, with the Labour-led coalition government moving 
away from the neo-liberal policies of the 1990s, and adopting what some have 
described  as  a  ‘social  democratic  model’  to  building  a  high-wage,  high-
productivity economy (Haworth et al., 2006: 49). However, much of it is built 
around voluntarist approaches, and despite efforts to build relationships between 
the  social  partners  in  the  post-ECA  environment,  this  section  raises  doubts 
about  whether  the  appropriate  institutional  structures  are  in  place  to  enable 
sectors caught in a low-wage, low-skills equilibrium to move in a ‘high road’ 
direction. 
The  introduction  of  the  ECA  represented  a  radical  transformation  of  wage 
bargaining in New Zealand. Under the previous system bargaining was highly 
centralised,  with  a  patchwork  of  nationally  bargaining  agreements  (Awards) 
covering specified occupations or industries, with coverage rates of around 60 
percent. Despite the centralised nature of the system, it lacked the cooperative 
features of the Danish approach. Indeed, it could be characterised as  highly 
legalistic  and  adversarial  (Deeks,  et  al.,  1994:  64),  which  was  one  factor 
contributing  to  its  demise.  It  was  also  primarily  a  mechanism  for  wage 
bargaining, and there was little in the way of integrating wages with training 
outcomes.  Moreover,  low  levels  of  training  at  the  time  were  considered  a 
significant  impediment  to  economic  performance  (ITF,  2003:  4).  Thus,  the 
centralised bargaining system lacked the sorts of complementarities evident in 
the Danish model. 
With the introduction of the ECA, union bargaining power was significantly 
diminished and bargaining quickly became focused at workplace level and on 
an  individualised  basis,  with  only  a  quarter  of  the  workforce  covered  by 
collective  agreements  by  the  mid-1990s.  Union  density  dropped  from  43 
percent in 1991 to 21 percent by 1999 (Blackwood et al., 2006: 2), with the 
greatest decreases occurring within those sectors where workers have the least 
bargaining  power.  For  example,  the  retail,  restaurant  and  hotel  sectors 
experienced a combined drop in membership of 81 percent between 1991 and 
1999 (Crawford et al., 2000: 6). With the rise in individual contracts, combined   12 
with large numbers of small and geographically spread workplaces and limited 
union resources, union organising became extremely problematic in the new 
environment. Research also showed significant levels of anti-union employer 
behaviour in sectors such as retail (McLaughlin and Rasmussen, 1998). 
With the removal of the Award system, there were no legal minimums for many 
employment  conditions  such  as  overtime  or  weekend  rates,  and  these  were 
quickly  reduced  or  completely  removed  in  many  cases.  Thus,  the  minimum 
wage  became  the  most  significant  institutional  mechanism  in  terms  of 
protecting the pay of many low-paid workers. The fact it was inadequate at 
doing  so  was  evidenced  by  various  studies  conducted  during  this  period  of 
service workers (Harbridge and Street, 1995) and retail employees (Conway, 
1999; McLaughlin, 2000), which found decreases in take-home pay, minimal 
wage  bargaining  occurring,  and  high  levels  of  dissatisfaction  with  income 
levels. Statistics NZ data also showed that average wages in low-paid sectors 
such as hospitality fell both in real terms and in relation to the rest of the labour 
market during the 1990s
5. 
The reforms introduced by the Government since 1999 are aimed at addressing 
these issues of labour market inequality, but they are also aimed at improving 
economic performance. One area of concern is New Zealand’s disappointing 
productivity  growth,  and  hence,  building  a  high-wage,  high-skill,  high-
productivity economy is high on the agenda. The Employment Relations Act 
2000 (and its 2004 Amendments) is part of this wider strategic plan. The Act 
has improved rights for unions in terms of achieving collective agreements and 
places  greater  emphasis  on  good  faith  behaviour,  both  in  collective  and 
individual  bargaining.  However,  the  impact  of  the  legislation  on  bargaining 
structures has thus far been minimal. Individual bargaining remains the norm, 
and  where  collective  bargaining  occurs,  it  is  predominantly  enterprise-based 
rather than multi-employer. In addition, union density levels in low-paid sectors 
remain  particularly  low.  For  example,  the  combined  density  rate  in  retail, 
restaurants and hotels is below 4 percent (Blackwood et al., 2006: 6). Anti-
union employer attitudes were also very evident in the interviews with industry 
associations.  Thus,  one  union  official  described  the  ERA  as  “the  ECA  with 
access rights for unions”. 
Consequently, low-paid workers, particularly those in small workplaces, remain 
dependent on employment legislation to improve their position. For this reason, 
there have been a number of improvements to individual employment rights 
since  1999,  including  the  introduction of  penal  rates  of  pay  for  working  on 
public holidays, a fourth week of annual leave and significant increases in the   13 
minimum  wage. The minimum wage has been increased incrementally from 
$6.50 in 1999, reaching $11.25 in 2007, an increase of 73 percent.   
This  significant  increase  in  the  minimum  wage  presents  fertile  ground  for 
testing  the  thesis  that  a  minimum  wage  can  impact  on  productivity  through 
encouraging firms to alter both their employment and product market strategies. 
In addition, unemployment reached a 20-year low of 3.7 percent in 2005 and 
has remained around this level since. This should act as an added incentive for 
firms  to  invest  in  training  and  retain  existing  staff  by  adopting  good 
employment practices. However, it is because of such conditions that employers 
in  low-paid  sectors  are  unable  to  make  the  transition  to  a  high-productivity 
strategy. Increasing wage costs in competitive product markets, combined with 
high staff turnover, make investment in a ‘high road’ strategy problematic. 
In relation to product market conditions, what emerged in the interviews was 
that  many  low-paying  sectors  are  not  particularly  profitable  for  SMEs.  For 
example, the average return on investment in bars and pubs cited by the relevant 
industry association was three percent. With interest rates in New Zealand at the 
time of the interviews around seven percent, this is a particularly poor return. In 
the restaurant industry there are similar concerns about poor profitability and 
business failure. 
The primary reason offered for low profitability was over-supply, which was 
keeping prices down. While the consumer is benefiting from a wide range of 
choice and competitively priced products, “it is the operators who are getting 
most of the squeeze”, said one association official. Clearly there is a market 
failure occurring with businesses continuing to enter the industry despite poor 
returns and business failures, while many of those who survive scrape by on a 
low-cost strategy.  
The solution advocated by employers’ associations in these sectors is one of 
encouraging  their  members  to  adopt  a  ‘value  added’  approach.  That  is,  to 
compete on the basis of quality, service and productivity, rather than on low-
cost. Given the staff-intensive nature of these businesses, the ability to invest in 
technology  or  other  areas  is  limited,  and  therefore  the  key  investment  is  in 
human capital. Hence, they are advocating greater investment in training as the 
route to higher productivity. As one official said, “we're certainly encouraging 
our members to invest in greater staff training…… they will be better paying 
three staff that are trained more money than having four untrained staff. The net 
profitability of that scenario will be much higher”. Others interviewed made 
similar comments about trained staff working smarter or staff who are trained 
and treated well selling more on behalf of the business, and this is a theme   14 
repeated  in  various  industry  workforce  strategies,  such  as  the  Tourism  and 
Hospitality Workforce Strategy (TIANZ, 2006). 
While employers’ associations point to the work they are doing to encourage 
greater levels of training, at the same time they recognise that there is a skills 
crisis in these industries. Again, various industry publications acknowledge this 
state of affairs. As another industry association CEO said in relation to the lack 
of training: 
The industry hasn’t been good at training… and has to take some 
responsibility because they haven’t been driving [it]… And we 
have  no  solution  to  the  problem,  which  I  suppose  is  an 
indictment on us… But we need to just encourage our members 
to train.  
However, in industries where profitability is so low, it is unrealistic to think that 
struggling employers will voluntarily invest in training. Adding to this situation 
is the tight labour market. With low wages, these industries are struggling to 
recruit and retain staff, and high staff turnover means that the employer making 
the investment is unlikely to benefit directly. The abundance of cheap labour 
during the 1990s made investing in staff an unnecessary option, but the current 
shortage of labour is making investing in staff a risky option. As one restaurant 
industry spokesperson said:  
The  average  life  of  a  restaurant  is  just  19  months,  so  that, 
combined  with  high  staff  turnover  in  the  industry,  has 
implications  for  training.  Should  I  train  this  person  who  isn’t 
going to stay when it will cost me and things are tight. So that’s 
an  economic  decision  they  make  and  that’s  not  good  for  the 
industry. 
Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Retail ITO (2006), of employees in the 
sector  who  had  undertaken  certified  industry training,  showed  that  while  60 
percent reported the training had increased their productivity and motivation, 
only 29 percent reported that it had led to an increase in pay. Similar figures 
were quoted to the author for research conducted by the hospitality ITO. Hence, 
there is no strong incentive for employees to stay in these industries following 
training or to undertake the training in the first place. In the context of severe 
skill shortages and high turnover it seems remarkable that, having made the 
investment in training, employers are not protecting that investment by paying 
higher wages. But as the restaurant industry spokesperson pointed out about the 
restaurant industry, “too many [firms] treat labour as a cost to be minimised 
rather than as an asset”.     15 
This attitude is reflected in aggregate data, which shows that wage increases in 
these sectors continue to fall behind the rest of the economy despite the skill 
shortages.  Data  for  2005,  the  latest  available  year,  shows  that  the  smallest 
average increases in sectoral wages were in hospitality and retail, the two lowest 
paying sectors in the economy, with increases below inflation
6. Moreover, these 
are two industries where the increase in the minimum wage would have had a 
significant impact, suggesting that market forces are very slow in these sectors. 
The fact that union influence in these sectors is minimal is also not insignificant. 
Thus, some of these industries are stuck in a low-wage, low-skills and low-
profitability equilibrium, and a ‘high road’ approach on an industry-wide basis 
will  not  emerge  as  the  result  of  encouraging  individual  firms  to  invest  in 
training or increase wages. Ultimately, it is a problem of market failure and will 
require institutional solutions.  
The  response  of  the  Government  has  been  to  build  a  range  of  voluntarist 
institutions  for  developing  coordination.  In  the  area  of  industry  training,  a 
review of current policy was conducted in 2001, with the aim of significantly 
increasing participation levels and improving the quality and responsiveness of 
training courses. This continued a process begun in the 1990s, where industry 
training  standards  were  developed  by  ITOs  and  linked  to  the  National 
Qualification Framework. This process has resulted in a training system closely 
aligned with the needs of industry. Thus, insufficient levels of training do not 
reflect employer dissatisfaction with the quality of training supplied, but are 
more to do with the demand for training. To increase the take-up of training by 
employers, the Government has almost doubled available funding since 1999. 
Employers  are  only  required  to  make  a  partial  contribution  to  any  training 
programmes they utilise. As a result, the number of participants in training per 
year  also  has  increased  significantly  in  this  period.  However,  despite  these 
successes,  the  issue  of  skill  shortages  remains  a  major  issue.  As  one  ITO 
reported, much of their work is with larger organisations. Convincing smaller 
firms of the benefits of training, even with the increased subsidies available, 
remains problematic.  
The Government has also brought together various industries within its ‘Sector 
Engagement  Strategy’,  a  strategy  aimed  at  enabling  industries  to  develop 
industry solutions for industry issues. Sector groups that have been formed so 
far  include  horticulture  and  viticulture,  tourism,  food  and  beverage 
(manufacture),  roading  and  construction,  wood  processing,  and  fishing.  A 
number  of  these  sectors  have  a  history  of  low  pay  and  poor  productivity. 
Horticulture  and  fishing  were  highlighted  by  one  government  official  as 
particularly problematic, with high numbers of illegal workers, passports being   16 
held  by  employers,  below  minimum  wage  pay-levels  and  crowded 
accommodation. The Government’s approach in these sectors is, he said: 
…both a stick and carrot approach – the stick of regulation but 
also  the  carrot  of  support  for  firms  to  operate  in  a  different 
manner…..  New  Zealand  workers  are  going  elsewhere,  the 
industry  pricing  is under  pressure  and  the  working conditions 
have been deteriorating over a period of time. The way out is to 
look at the sustainability of the industry – how can it compete on 
a  different  basis?  This  requires  addressing  industrial  relations 
issues,  training,  investment,  exit  strategies  for  unprofitable 
business,  venture  capital,  clustering,  networks,  regional 
development and so on. 
Thus,  it  involves  looking  at  the  economic  drivers  of  both  low  pay  and  low 
profitability, which, as this discussion suggests, are inextricably linked in highly 
competitive, low-paid sectors dominated by SMEs. It also involves addressing a 
range of other related industry issues. This approach sheds light on the question 
of whether higher minimum wages would act as a ‘shock effect’ in low-paid 
sectors  without  a  wider  supportive  institutional  framework.  The  ‘Sector 
Engagement  Strategy’  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  industry  issues  are 
complex and interrelated, and enforcement of standards needs to be balanced by 
institutional supports to assist employers make the transition to a ‘high road’ 
strategy. Government officials are cautiously optimistic about the potential for 
success of the Sector Engagement Strategy. As one official noted “there appears 
to be positive signs so far from the engagement of these sectors, beginning to 
actually face up to the issues”. 
Ultimately, however, this approach is a voluntarist one and it does not require 
firms to adopt strategies that they find unpalatable, but which may deliver more 
beneficial  outcomes.  One  solution  proposed  by  the  NZCTU  is  to  link  the 
training  system  with  wage  bargaining,  preferably  through  some  form  of 
industry-level bargaining mechanism. They acknowledge that this would need 
to  be  quite  different  to  the  pre-1991  Award  system;  “more  sophisticated… 
connected with enterprise and industry”. They also accept that it is unlikely to 
be  on  the  agenda  for  some  time  as  a  result  of  uncompromising  employer 
opposition. While relationships between unions and employers at the national 
level have improved over recent years, a significant ideological divide exists 
over  industrial  relations  policy.  In  this  context,  statutory  supported  industry 
bargaining is certainly not one of the institutional supports on the Government’s 
agenda. However, it seems unlikely that the current institutional framework in 
New Zealand will be effective in pushing some of these low-paid industries in a 
‘high road’ direction.   17 
Ireland 
Like Denmark and New Zealand, there has also been significant interest in the 
Irish story. In Ireland’s case it is because of the phenomenal economic growth 
since the mid-1990s. While much of this success is due to investment by US 
MNCs, there are also a number of other important factors, one of which is the 
social partnership process (Hardiman, 2003). From the perspective of low pay 
and  productivity,  social  partnership  provides  the  Irish  with  opportunities  to 
develop  coordinated  solutions  to  these  issues.  However,  as  this  section  will 
show, despite a comparatively high minimum wage and a booming economy, 
many of their low-paid sectors are caught in a low-wage, low-skills equilibrium 
facing similar issues to New Zealand.  
Ireland has a range of institutional mechanisms that play a role in addressing 
low pay. A minimum wage was first introduced in 2000. While there is no set 
mechanism  for  reviewing  it,  the  rate  has  been  increased  on  a  number  of 
occasions. In 2002 it was €6.35 an hour and by July 2007 it had risen to €8.65, 
an increase of 36 percent over five years. It is now over 50 percent of average 
earnings, which places it at the upper end of the OECD scale of minimum-to-
average wage ratios. In addition to the minimum wage, Ireland has long had a 
system of Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) similar to the Wages Councils that 
were abolished in the UK in 1993. The JLCs are industry and sub-industry level 
agreements that set minimum terms and conditions of employment for various 
categories  of  workers,  with  high  rates  of  pay  for  length  of  service  and 
responsibility. Some include other conditions of employment not covered by 
law, such as overtime rates and sick leave. They are negotiated between unions 
and employers from the sector with an independent chairperson, and the Labour 
Relations Commission estimate they cover around 200,000 workers. Wage rates 
begin marginally above the minimum wage, and given their extensive coverage 
over  low-paid  sectors,  this  may  explain  why  Ireland  has  comparatively  few 
workers on the minimum wage, but a high number classified as ‘low paid’. 23 
percent of the workforce falls into this low-paid category (Nolan, 2007: 19). 
Thus, there is significant wage compression just above the minimum wage. 
There is no doubt that social partnership has played a role in both ensuring the 
continuation of the JLC system and raising the minimum wage, in that it has 
enabled unions and community groups to keep the issue of low pay and income 
inequality  on  the  political  agenda.  In  addition,  many  of  the  partnership 
agreements  have  included  special  pay  rises  for  low-paid  workers.  Thus,  a 
number  of  union  officials  noted  that  social  partnership  had  enabled  these 
workers to gain wage increases they would not have obtained in a decentralised 
environment.  Moreover,  the  argument  is  made  that  it  has  prevented  the   18 
decreases in real income at the lower end of the distribution that have been 
experienced in more neo-liberal economies (Hardiman, 2000: 301). 
More  recently,  however,  unions  representing  the  low  paid  have  become 
disillusioned with social partnership, arguing that it is increasingly difficult to 
gain  political  traction  around  the  issue  of  low  pay.  MANDATE,  which 
represents hospitality, retail and office workers and is the third largest union in 
Ireland, did not sign up to the latest partnership agreement. They also paint a 
fairly  depressing  picture  of  the  state  of  industrial  relations  in  unionised 
workplaces, with employers constantly trying to reduce entitlements such as 
sick pay, overtime rates and allowances in return for pay rises. Union density 
across the labour market is around 35 percent, but it is significantly lower in 
low-paid industries like retail (18 percent), hotels and restaurants (12 percent) 
and agriculture, forestry and fishing (14 percent) (Geary, 2006: 19). In such 
sectors, membership is likely to be concentrated in a small number of large 
workplaces, with one union representing low-paid workers estimating that 60 
percent of their members were in closed shop agreements. Thus, despite the 
influence  of  unions  in  the  social  partnership  process  at  national  level,  the 
minimum  wage  and  the  JLCs  continue  to  be  the  primary  wage-protection 
mechanisms for the large majority of low-paid workers.  
Given this context of adversarial industrial relations, it is not surprising that 
there were similar issues to the New Zealand case in relation to productivity in 
low-paid sectors. With low unemployment and higher wages elsewhere, low-
paid sectors have been facing severe recruitment and retention problems for 
some  time.  Poor  wages  and  employment  conditions  are  reflected  in  low-job 
satisfaction, with one survey of employees’ across the economy showing the 
hotel and restaurant sector to have the lowest levels of job satisfaction by a 
significant margin (O’Connell et al., 2004: 28). As a result, Irish workers are 
choosing  to  work  in  industries  with  better  wages  and  working  conditions. 
Sectors such as agriculture, tourism and hospitality are increasingly reliant on 
immigrant  workers,  who  now  make  up  10  percent  of  the  Irish  workforce 
(Roche, 2007a). A number of union officials suggested that this has provided 
employers with a steady stream of relatively cheap and compliant labour, which 
has kept wages down. 
Various strategy documents from low-paid industries identify staff retention as 
a  serious  problem,  and  yet  these  industry  associations  continue  to  oppose 
increases  in  the  minimum  wage  (e.g.  IHF,  2006)  arguing  that  it  will  affect 
competitiveness. Some of these industries can point to supporting evidence. For 
example, in the tourism and hospitality sectors a number of visitor and tour 
operator  surveys  show  that  Ireland  is  no  longer  seen  as  the  cheap  tourist   19 
destination it once was with high levels of dissatisfaction with value for money 
(ITIC,  2006a:  39-40).  Employers  associations  also  cite  poor  profits  among 
sectors like restaurants and bars. Thus, as in the New Zealand case, competitive 
pressures  are  preventing  wage  increases  being  accommodated  through  price 
rises among smaller firms. Instead, it would appear they are being absorbed 
through lower profits.  
The solution proposed by industry associations is to encourage employers to 
raise productivity by investing in training and innovative product development. 
However,  like  the  New  Zealand  case,  cost-minimisation  strategies  dominate 
management thinking in such sectors, with low levels of investment in training 
by employers in these industries (O’Connell et al., 2004: 77) and comparatively 
poor productivity in private sector services (NCC, 2005: 35). A recent report by 
the  Irish  Tourist  Industry  Confederation  (ITIC,  2006b:  28)  pointed  to  “real 
difficulties” the industry faced in raising investment in training, including high 
staff turnover and exit rates from the industry, disruptions to business while 
employees  are  on  training,  the  financial  costs  involved  for  SMEs,  and 
dissatisfaction with current training programmes. Thus, low-paid industries in 
Ireland are also caught in a low-wage, low-skills, low-productivity equilibrium.  
Union officials argued that higher wages would coerce employers down this 
route, yet neither the comparatively high minimum wage nor the JLC wages are 
driving the majority of firms in this direction. Clearly higher wages are not 
enough on their own to induce the ‘shock effect’. They are important but they 
are  only  one  component  of  a  wider  supportive  institutional  framework  that 
enables  employers  to  address  employment  and  product  market  pressures 
simultaneously.   
While Ireland has the social partnership structures at national level, the broader 
institutional context makes the adoption of a ‘high road’ strategy on an industry-
wide basis problematic. Granted, the social partnership process is underpinned 
by  a  shared  vision  of  building  a  high-wage,  high-productivity  sustainable 
economy.  Additionally,  there  is  a  shared  acknowledgement  that  much  of 
Ireland’s productivity growth is driven by US multinationals, with a significant 
divide in productivity levels between foreign and indigenous firms. This is why 
much of the latest social partnership agreement, Towards 2016, is devoted to 
building  a  high-skilled  workforce,  supporting  lifelong  learning,  encouraging 
innovation,  developing  partnership  at  work  and  improving  employee 
involvement. Various other national-level strategy documents repeat the same 
themes.  
However,  while  there  is  agreement  about  the  strategic  aims,  there  is  little 
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about. Part of this relates to the policy influence of MNCs, which have made it 
clear they wish to operate in a non-union environment. In addition, industrial 
relations strategies and practices have become increasingly adversarial (Roche, 
2007a: 63-65). Surveys show that anti-union employer attitudes are widespread 
in both foreign and indigenous companies (D’Art and Turner, 2005), and this is 
despite the positive role that unions have played at national level in improving 
Ireland’s  economic  performance.  Thus,  a  number  of  commentators  talk  of 
‘truncated  partnership’  (Geary  and  Roche,  2002:  13)  with  social  partnership 
below  the  national  level  remaining  somewhat  experimental  and  limited,  and 
almost non-existent at workplace level. 
As  a  result  institutional  solutions,  such  as  union  recognition  legislation  or 
linking  the  training  system  with  the  wage  bargaining  system,  are  off  the 
political agenda. Without the coordination mechanisms evident in the Danish 
case, the strategy relies on ‘encouraging’ individual firms to adopt ‘high road’ 
strategies.  To  this  end,  a  number  of  state  organisations  and  national-level 
tripartite  groups  have  a  mandate  to  encourage  investment  in  training, 
innovation, workplace partnership and networking, while providing funds for 
experimental initiatives. 
One initiative in the area of training is the enterprise-led Skillnets programme 
where grants are provided to support firms that create a network to coordinate 
their training needs. Skillnets began in 1999 and since that time it has funded 
over  120  networks  involving  more  than  6,000  enterprises  and  35,000 
employees.  The  Government  has  recently  more  than  doubled  the  funding 
available. In addition, the proportion of total training costs that grants will cover 
has recently been increased, with up to 90 percent of training costs covered for 
networks that meet key criteria, such as training of less-skilled workers or those 
working in declining sectors. In terms of meeting the needs of SMEs in low-
paid sectors, Skillnets appears on the surface at least to be successful. The large 
majority of participating firms are SMEs (82 percent) and the networks come 
from a wide range of industries, including low-paid sectors. Indeed, one of the 
largest  and  most  successful  networks  is  in  the  retail  sector.  Employers 
associations and government officials both described Skillnets as a significant 
success story in addressing Ireland’s skills shortage. 
 
However,  at  this  stage  any  evaluation  should  be  a  cautious  one.  Firstly,  as 
outlined earlier, the general picture on training in low-paid sectors and among 
low-skilled workers suggests there is a long way to go. Secondly, high staff 
turnover and financial costs still remain disincentives for many companies to 
invest in training, as even an official of Skillnets noted. Despite the high grants 
available, there are still costs involved for firms as grants cannot be used to   21 
cover replacements for staff away on training. Thirdly, while accreditation from 
the  National  Framework  of  Qualifications  for  training  programmes  is 
encouraged, certification is not a requirement of receiving a grant. However, 
without certification the incentives for employees to become involved (higher 
wages  and  improved  job  advancement  opportunities)  are  weaker.  Fourthly, 
while Skillnets itself is a social partnership initiative, union involvement in the 
networks is not a requirement and it is no surprise therefore that unions are not 
included in many of the networks. The successful retail network epitomises the 
paradoxical Irish situation. The network is driven by IBEC, the peak employers’ 
association,  which  has  signed  up  to  the  various  partnership  agreements  that 
espouse  the  benefits  of  union  involvement.  However,  they  have  set  up  and 
developed the retail training network without the involvement of unions in the 
sector. One union official suggested that this was because it would have been 
unpalatable  to  their  own  membership.  The  concern  over  a  lack  of  union 
participation is that various studies in Ireland find that training is significantly 
higher in firms with union involvement (O’Connell et al., 2004: 11; Roche, 
2007b: 197). This is not surprising in light of the Danish case, where union 
participation  ensures  employers  adopt  a  long-term  approach  to  training  and 
where representatives at workplace level encourage workers to avail of training 
opportunities.  Finally,  the  Skillnets  approach  seems  to  lack  a  sense  of 
coherence. Networks vary significantly in terms of objectives and size, they 
may duplicate the activities of other networks, and networks are unlikely to 
form in areas where training shortfalls relate to more systemic problems. This 
last point suggests that an industry approach may be more efficient. 
Of course, the irony is that institutional configurations already exist at industry 
level in low-paid sectors in the form of the JLCs, and these could have some 
potential in terms of linking wage bargaining with training outcomes through 
the development of industry training certification systems. Given the adversarial 
nature  of  industrial  relations  in  these  sectors,  and  the  anti-union  employer 
attitudes discussed earlier, this would undoubtedly be problematic. JLCs are not 
underpinned by the social partnership ethos, but remain traditional, adversarial 
bargaining  mechanisms.  However,  need  it  stay  this  way?  With  funding  for 
various partnership initiatives and experiments already a key part of the current 
strategy,  perhaps  one  JLC  could  be  used  to  pilot  an  industry  partnership 
initiative. A large enough financial carrot might encourage industry associations 
and unions in the sector to begin working together in a more positive way to 
address  industry  issues,  such  as  low  productivity  and  inadequate  levels  of 
training, along the lines of the New Zealand Sector Engagement Strategy but 
with wage bargaining as a part of the mix.    22 
Conclusion 
This analysis of the training issues that low-paid sectors face in these three 
countries in trying to move in a ‘high road’ direction, adds further evidence to 
recent contributions to the literature that a high minimum wage on its own will 
not provide much of a ‘shock effect’. Clearly, there are a range of factors that 
impact on firms’ decisions about adopting high-productivity employment and 
product  market  strategies.  Denmark,  New  Zealand  and  Ireland  all  have 
comparatively  high  minimum  wages  but  their  effectiveness  at  addressing 
productivity issues in low-paid sectors differs markedly. Thus, high wages may 
play a role, but the wider institutional framework is fundamental to creating the 
environment that will enable such transformative change to occur. 
In  the  Danish  case,  high  levels  of  Government  funding  for  training  are 
important, but this too is only one element in a range of policy and institutional 
supports.  The  coordination  mechanisms  between  employers  and  unions  at 
various levels of the economy play a pivotal role in ensuring that the funding is 
used effectively through an on-going process of developing, implementing and 
reviewing  training  programmes.  The  connection  with  the  wage  bargaining 
system  means  that  training  outcomes  and  wages  can  be  linked.  It  has  also 
enabled unions to negotiate for employer contributions to sectoral training funds 
and  for  training  leave  entitlements  for  workers,  and  thus  unions  play  a 
significant  role  in  ensuring  firms  contribute  financially  to  a  coordinated 
solution. Unions  also  have  an  important  responsibility  at workplace  level  in 
encouraging  workers  to  avail  of  training  opportunities.  Underpinning  the 
various  mechanisms  is  a  consensus-based  relationship  between  the  social 
partners  at  all  levels  of  the  economy.  Thus,  the  various  coordination 
mechanisms ensure that the adoption of a high-productivity strategy in low-paid 
sectors is reasonably widespread. Where issues arise, such as the imbalance in 
training away from unskilled workers, these mechanisms ensure they can be 
effectively addressed. 
In contrast, in the New Zealand and Irish cases there is evidence of inadequate 
levels of training in low-paid sectors, particularly among SMEs. In the context 
of severe skills shortages, industry associations are encouraging their members 
to  raise  productivity  through  investment  in  training  and  to  raise  wages  to 
improve  recruitment  and  retention  of  staff.  However,  poor  profitability 
combined with high staff turnover makes this a difficult strategy for firms to 
pursue. Hence, many low-paid sectors are caught in a low-wage, low-skills and 
low-productivity  equilibrium.  In  both  cases,  voluntarist  responses  are  being 
adopted,  such  as  education  campaigns  by  business  associations  about  the 
benefits of training or the Skillnets training networks in Ireland. However, while   23 
these approaches may be important they are not enough as they do not fully 
overcome  the  ‘prisoners’  dilemma’  issues  that  firms  face.  As  a  result,  their 
impact is limited. 
This  of  course  raises  the  issue  of  voluntarist  policy  options  versus  those 
involving some degree of compulsion, and the analysis in this paper strongly 
suggests  that  completely  voluntarist  approaches  are  not  working.  Levies  on 
employers to fund industry training are perhaps the most straight-forward of 
mandatory  options,  but  these  need  to  be  part  of  a  wider  set  of  supportive 
mechanisms in order to deliver the sorts of complementarities present in the 
Danish case. Employers in Ireland pay a training levy, but insufficient levels of 
training still remain a serious concern. The industrial training boards (ITBs) in 
the  UK  also  involved  levies  on  employers  and  were  set  up  in  the  1960s  to 
address the ‘poaching’ problem. They remained in place until the 1980s, but as 
Pemberton  (2001)  argues  the  ITB  system  failed  because  of  fragmented 
institutional arrangements. In addition, he notes that the tripartism underpinning 
it was superficial, and hence there was little consensus developed that might 
have  overcome  some  of  the  institutional  shortcomings.  Clearly,  individual 
issues like training cannot be addressed in isolation. Rather, solutions need to 
take account of a range of factors impacting on firms’ decisions, and they need 
to be embedded in a supportive institutional framework. 
The approach being suggested here then is not a compulsion versus voluntarist 
dichotomy. Voluntarist approaches have an important role to play. There needs 
to be some element of compulsion, but the institutional arrangements also need 
to  facilitate  social  partnership  and  consensus-building.  In  the  Danish  model, 
strong  unions  provide  the  element  of  compulsion  but  the  consensus-based 
relationship is also fundamental to its success. The Sector Engagement Strategy 
in New Zealand is a step in the right direction, and it illustrates the benefits of 
creating social partnership at sectoral level to address a range of complex and 
interrelated  issues.  Central  government  involvement  also  means  that  the 
potential exists for policy to be designed to support rather than hinder solutions 
to  these  issues.  However,  this  approach  is  wholly  voluntarist  and  does  not 
require  firms  to  adopt  strategies  that  they  find  unpalatable,  but  which  may 
deliver more beneficial outcomes. For example, sectoral-level wage bargaining 
could play an important coordination role in linking training outcomes to wages 
and enabling unions to negotiate for training entitlements for workers, but New 
Zealand employers will not freely choose this path. 
Some  of  the  issues  raised  in  the  New  Zealand  and  Irish  cases  illustrate  the 
difficulties  involved  in  developing  institutional  solutions  in  LMEs  where 
employers are resistant to such solutions, particularly when they involve unions.   24 
The  institutional  complementarities  evident  in  Denmark  are  the  result  of 
historical,  cultural,  social  and  political  processes,  and  many  aspects  of  the 
Danish approach will not be easily replicated elsewhere. Indeed, the question 
could be asked ‘are the complementarities characteristic of CMEs so deeply 
rooted that any attempt by LMEs to replicate them is futile?’ The conclusion 
reached here is one of qualified optimism. It will undoubtedly be problematic 
though not impossible. Firstly, the political will needs to exist for appropriate 
institutional  mechanisms  to  be  introduced,  such  as  industry  bargaining 
mechanisms linked to national training systems. Employer associations will not 
be supportive but both Ireland and New Zealand provide compelling evidence 
that the current approach is not working. Secondly, social partnership needs to 
be  developed  and  nurtured  at  the  institutional  level.  As  the  Irish  and  New 
Zealand  experience  shows,  this  is  not  impossible  in  contexts  that  might  be 
considered inhospitable to such arrangements, though in both cases these are 
much stronger at national level than at sectoral level.  
The JLCs in Ireland provide a unique opportunity for the Irish to experiment 
with building coordination mechanisms underpinned by social partnership in 
low-paid  sectors.  The  sectoral  bargaining  mechanisms  already  exist,  so  the 
potential  is  there  to  extend  their  scope  so  that  they  become  forums  for 
developing  joint  solutions  to  industry  issues.  Given  the  adversarial  state  of 
industrial relations in these sectors this will not be easy, but a significant enough 
financial incentive to one or two JLCs may encourage the actors to engage in 
more meaningful dialogue and begin developing industry-based solutions to the 
skills and productivity issues they face. 
The three countries analysed are all small economies, which makes dialogue 
and consensus-building somewhat easier. There is no doubt that similar policy 
issues exist in many larger LMEs, such as the UK. The question is whether such 
sectoral-level mechanisms could be established in larger economies. Could the 
UK Wages Councils, for example, have been developed beyond adversarial, 
industry bargaining mechanisms? The discussion here suggests that perhaps a 
case exists for their re-introduction, albeit in a modernised form. The question 
of whether partnership could be developed within such institutional mechanisms 
is  best  left  to  scholars  of  the  UK  context.  What  is  clear,  however,  is  that 
voluntarist approaches to addressing the product and labour market issues that 
low-paid sectors face will not be successful. These are issues of market failure, 
and the analysis presented here shows that institutional solutions are needed to 
enable industries caught in a low-wage, low-skills, low-productivity equilibrium 
to begin moving down the ‘high road’ path.   25 
 
Notes 
1 This distinction in the institutional literature between the skill sets in LMEs 
and CMEs is now recognised as rather simplistic, and has been replaced with a 
more nuanced view which recognises the different mix of skills that each type 
of  economy  delivers.  Nonetheless,  it  is  generally  recognised  that  LMEs 
continue to be poor at providing skills at the lower end of the labour market 
(Thelen, 2004: 5, 9-10).    
2 Streeck (1997) refers to this as ‘beneficial constraint’. That is, society can 
benefit from placing constraints on the strategic options available to the actors. 
3 It is not possible to calculate a ratio of minimum pay rates in the collective 
agreements to average wages as Statistics Denmark do not calculate average 
earnings for the whole economy. However, sectoral data (Kudsk-Iversen and 
Jørgensen, 2005: 3) suggests it will be well over 60 percent, and a 1997 estimate 
was 70 percent of average wages (see Rubery, 2001: 158). 
4 A commonly used definition of ‘low-pay’ is less than two-thirds of median 
hourly earnings. 
5 Data provided directly by Statistics NZ, calculations by the author. 
6 Data provided directly by Statistics NZ. 
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